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The EU farmers are subject to mandatory cross-compliance measures requiring them to meet 
environmental  conditions  to  be  eligible  for  public  support.  These  obligations  reinforce 
incentives  for  the  farmers  to  change  their  behaviour  towards  the  environment.  We  apply 
quasi-experimental methods to measure the causal relationship between cross-compliance and 
farm environmental performance. We find that cross-compliance reduced farm fertiliser and 
pesticide expenditure. This result also holds for farmers who participated in other voluntary 
agro-environmental  schemes.  However,  the  results  do  not  support  our  expectations  that 
farmers who relied on larger shares of public payments had a stronger motivation to improve 
their environmental performance.  
 




1.  Introduction 
With  increased  pressure  to  integrate  environmental  concerns  into  agricultural  policy, 
environmental cross-compliance is increasingly being used as a policy tool for improving the 
environmental quality of farm management. Cross-compliance means to make the receipt of 
public  support  payments  contingent  on  compliance  with  environmental  and  other 
requirements.
1 Environmental cross-compliance, first explicitly introduced in the 1985 US 
Farm Bill, has become a popular measure in the European Union (EU), after the failure of 
more voluntary approaches  (Osterburg et al., 2005) .  The EU Common Rules Regulation 
(European  Commission,  1999)   provides  a  possibility  for  introducing  cross -compliance 
measures. However, up to 2005 such measures were optional for EU Member States (MS) but 
they became mandatory with the 2003 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform for all 
European farmers applying to all direct payments from 2005  (European Commission, 2003). 
MS must now set farming standards in relation to EU regulations and directives (Statutory 
Management  Requirements  or  SMR)  and  define  Good  Agricultural  and  Environmental 
Conditions (GAEC). 
 
Environmental cross-compliance strategies have considerable  support  in that they remove 
some of the inconsistencies of previous agricultural policies. Previously, one agricultural 
program rewarded a farmer for non -conservation  behaviour  (e.g. subsidies dependant on 
production), while another encouraged conservation (e.g. EU Nitrate Directive). Moreover, by 
shifting from a policy of paying farmers to reduce their pollution to requiring them to comply 
with environmental standards using the reduction o f support payments as an additional 
sanction, somewhat implements the “polluter pays principle” in the agricultural sector.  
 
The effectiveness of any cross-compliance programme depends on numerous aspects. Winter 
and May (2001) discuss some of these factors. In principal, regulated farms comply with a 
given  regulation  when  they  conclude  that  the  benefits  of  compliance  (here,  received 
subsidies),  exceed  the  costs  of  compliance  (here,  costs  of  improving  environmental 
                                                       
1 According to Swales et al. (2007), the notion of cross-compliance originated in the US, in the 1970s. It refers to 
conditions that farmers must meet in order to be eligible for assistance under government support schemes for 
agriculture. In the US, farmers claiming support under one programme had to comply with both the rules of that 
programme and certain obligations of other federal programs: thus making a link “across programmes” which 
gave rise to the term “cross-compliance”. The use of the term has been extended since then, both within the US 
and elsewhere, to refer to linkages between agricultural and environmental (and other) policies. In the EU, the 
term “cross-compliance” is fully recognised and utilised by the European Commission. For a comparison of agri-
environmental policies in the EU and United States see Baylis et al. (2008). 3 
 
conditions). A second motivation for compliance comes from regulated farmers’ combined 
sense of moral duty
2 and agreement with the importance of a given regulation. Awareness of 
what a given regulation is requiring is also a prerequisite for compliance. In the context of the 
recently introduced European environmental cross-compliance, incentives to comply will be 
highest for farmers that receive the highest subsidy payments (Bennett et al., 2006). Likewise, 
the more decoupled the payments are from production, the more responsive farmers are likely 
to be in their reaction to the cross-compliance requirements (Webster and Williams, 2002). 
Nevertheless, Juntti (2006) argues that the likelihood of achieving significant environmental 
improvements in Europe with cross-compliance is low. The reason for this is an apparent 
mismatch  between  the  aspirations  set  out  by  the  2003  CAP  reform  to  simultaneously 
liberalise the agricultural sector, secure high international competitiveness and at the same 
time to enhance environmental standards. According to Juntti (2006), these multiple aims 
limit the capacity of cross-compliance to properly secure environmental objectives. 
 
To date, the overall effect of European environmental cross-compliance on environmental 
outcomes is not clear. The existing studies on the environmental improvements arising from 
cross-compliance are few and mainly based on either expert judgement or simulation models 
rather than direct empirical measurement of environmental outcomes. Several projects have 
analysed cross-compliance implementation in the EU.
3 They focus have been on a number of 
aspects of  EU-wide  post-2005 cross-compliance,  such as implementation costs, degree of 
cross-compliance, effects on competitiveness, environmental effects , among others. Their 
results on environmental effects are rather similar: cross -compliance is effective (i.e. it 
improves compliance with environmental regulations); complia nce levels are high; and the 
early evidence (mostly anecdotal) suggests that cross-compliance improved farming practice 
up to EU standards   (Elbersen et al., 2010; Jongeneel and Brouwer, 2006; Swales, 2007; 
Swales et al., 2007). 
 
Few studies address cross -compliance in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy 
decoupling. Brady et al. (2009) assess the long-term effects of the 2003 CAP reform on farm 
structure, landscape mosaic and biodiversity using a spatial agent-based model for a sample of 
EU regions. They find that GAEC measures did not prove to be a sufficient measure to avoid 
                                                       
2  See  Mzoughi    (2011)  for  more  discussion  on  how  moral  and  social  concerns  affect  farm  environmental 
behaviour. 
3 See the report made by Jongeneel et al. (2007) for the synthesis of the projects on cross-compliance.  4 
 
all of the environmental consequences of decoupling (their other results show that decoupling 
would, in some regions, have resulted in land abandonment, resulting in an even greater loss 
in  mosaic and biodiversity values). Also,  they  show that environmental  outcomes  greatly 
depend on the regional characteristics, and this calls for spatially differentiated environmental 
policy  instruments.
4  Mosnier et al.  (2009)  employ a farm-level bio-economic model to 
estimate the effect of decoupled payments and cross -compliance measures for two typical 
arable farms in the Southwest of France. Their results show that if cross-compliance measures 
are imposed, a small reduction in the cultivated area of irrigated crops is observed and 
environmental indicators at farm level are improved. In Switzerland (not an EU member), a 
similar policy (Proof of Ecological Performance) has been shown to be effective in reducing 
diffuse nitrogen and phosphorus pollution from agriculture although some goals were not 
reached (Herzog et al., 2008).  
 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to empirically evaluate the impact 
of  the  newly  reorganised  European  agricultural  policy  on  farmers’  environmental 
performance by using econometric techniques. Swales (2006) stresses that cross-compliance 
does not seek to address all environmental issues in agriculture. Thus, following him, we 
should  judge  the  environmental  effectiveness  of  cross-compliance  only  in  relation  to  its 
objectives  and the framework  available to meet these objectives.  One  of the main  cross-
compliance  environmental  issues  is  water  pollution,  soil  quality  and  the  protection  of 
biodiversity features. Thus, in this paper we focus on specific quantitatively measurable and 
available environmental indicators related to the above mentioned primary cross-compliance 
environmental  issues.  The  farm’s  usage  of  artificial  fertilisers  and  pesticides  are  our 
environmental indicators (proxies) for cross-compliance effectiveness.  
 
The effect of the cross-compliance policy on farm environmental performance is identified 
using difference-in-differences method, where we investigate the response of farms subject to 
national cross-compliance measures introduced before the introduction of the EU-wide cross-
compliance policy in 2005.
5 Our main hypothesis is that cross -compliance should improve 
environmental performance in the form of fertiliser and pesticide reduction. To sharpen the 
identification,  we  take  into  account  fa rms’  dependency  on  overall  subsidies  and  also 
                                                       
4 The major shortcoming of cross-compliance is that it does not take into account differences between farms and 
the effect of farmers on the environment.  
5 To distinguish between cross-compliance measures introduced before 2005 and after 2005, we define pre-2005 
cross-compliance as national cross-compliance, and post-2005 cross-compliance as EU-wide cross-compliance. 5 
 
participation in other (voluntary) agro-environmental schemes. We account for observed and 
unobserved farm-level heterogeneity by controlling for farm productivity changes and other 
farm and time specific characteristics. 
 
The  following  Section  2  describes  the  background  on  the  EU  cross-compliance  policy. 
Section 3 outlines the empirical framework we employ. The data and the descriptive statistics 
of the main variables are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the main results and 
robustness checks. Section 6 provides our conclusions.  
 
2.  Policy background  
Cross-compliance has been discussed in the EU since the early 1990s, and various reforms of 
the  CAP  have  increased  the  importance  of  cross-compliance  as  a  policy  tool  for 
environmental integration.  
 
To address some of the changes in farming practices which negatively affect the state of the 
environment,  the  CAP  reform  of  1999  (Agenda  2000)  introduced  for  the  first  time  the 
principle of compliance with environmental requirements. The Horizontal Regulation (Article 
3 of Regulation 1259/1999, covering all payments granted directly to farmers) gave an option 
to Member States to introduce cross-compliance measures, or, as outlined in the regulation, 
“specific environmental requirements constituting a condition for direct payments”, relating 
to one or more environmental issues (European Commission, 1999). 
 
Nine out of 15 EU Member States introduced some cross-compliance measures following the 
Horizontal Regulation (see Table 1). As it was up to each MS to decide on a cross-compliance 
strategy, implementation of this national cross-compliance differed across MS. Activities that 
were subject to some cross-compliance measures include soil management to control surface 
water  run-off,  animal  waste  management,  sustainable  crop  rotation  and  efficient  use  of 
fertiliser  and  pesticides.
6  However,  the  implementation  of  national  cross-compliance 
measures  was  below  the  expectations  of  the  EU  Commission,  so  that  in  2005  cross-
compliance became an obligatory element of the new agricultural policy reform.  
                                                       
6 See Bergschmidt et al. (2003) for a comprehensive discussion on the national cross-compliance measures 
introduced across MS.  6 
 
From 2005 onwards, farmers in receipt of CAP direct payments are required to respect a set 
of  SMR  set  out  in  Annex  III  of  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No.  1782/2003  (European 
Commission, 2003). They also have to meet minimum requirements of GAEC, to be defined 
by Member States, on the basis of a Community framework given in Annex IV of the same 
regulation.  
 
Table 1 Implementation of cross-compliance in Member States of EU15 before 2005  
Group  Cross-compliance standards   Countries 
THE TREATMENT 
GROUP 
Standards beyond existing legislation 
Austria, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, UK 
Combination of existing legislation 
and standards beyond 
Finland, Greece, Italy, Spain 
Legal standards 
France, Denmark (abandoned in 
2002) 
THE CONTROL  
GROUP 
No cross-compliance 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden 
 
Source: Adapted from Osterburg et al. (2005). 
 
As  summarised  by  Swales  (2006),  the  recital  of  Regulation  1782/2003  set  out  three 
objectives. The first is to integrate basic standards for the environment, food safety, animal 
health and welfare and good agricultural and environmental condition in the common market 
organisation by linking direct aid to rules relating to agricultural land, agricultural production 
and activity. A second objective is to avoid the abandonment of agricultural land and ensure 
that it is maintained in good agricultural and environmental condition. Land abandonment 
may, alongside other drivers, arise as a result of decoupling. A third objective is to maintain 
the existing area of permanent pasture as it is  regarded to have a positive environmental 
effect.  
 
The EU15 Member States are subject to EU-wide cross-compliance since 2005, although the 
full set of SMRs was not implemented until January 2007. The MS that acceded to the EU in 
2004 have been implementing the SMRs from 2009, and later still in Bulgaria and Romania, 
although standards for GAEC have been introduced.  
 7 
 
3.  Empirical identification strategy 
Differences in the timing and nature of the reform policies implemented across EU Member 
States are used as a quasi-natural experiment for establishing causal policy relationships.
7 
First, Member States are grouped in terms of the timing of the implementation of the cross -
compliance policies. Second, treatment and control groups are identified within the sample of 
countries (see Table 1 for the treatment and the control groups by country; and Figure 1 for a 
simplified graphical representation of the identification strategy). 
 
Figure 1 The graphical representation of the policy effect identification strategy  
 
 
We  use  a  difference-in-differences  identification  strategy  that  is  “backward  looking”  as 
opposed  to  the  common  approach  of  “forward  looking”  difference-in-differences 
methodologies, where pre-policy time period values are used as the base reference point for 
the policy effect. In our case, the base reference point is the time period (post-2005) when 
both  the  control  and  treatment  groups  have  implemented  the  EU-wide  cross-compliance 
policies. The difference between the control and the treatment groups in the pre-2005 time 
period, taking into account the treatment and the control group differences in the post-2005 
time  period  and  the  common  trends,  is  our  national  cross-compliance  policy  effect.  The 
                                                       
7  See  Greenstone  and  Gayer  (2009)  for  a  comprehensive  discussion  and  examples  on  quasi-experimental 
approaches to environmental economics.  8 
 




The difficulty in modelling farm environmental performance using farm-level data is that we 
do not observe this performance directly. As such, we consider two proxy variables to capture 
farms’ environmental performance, namely, expenditure on pesticides and fertilisers. 
 
One of the main concerns regarding our identification assumption is that time variant farm 
specific unobserved productivity may differ systematically across the treatment and control 
groups.  For  example,  it  might  be  the  case  that  the  decoupling  policy  changed  farmers’ 
individual productivity and this in turn led to changes in farmer’s behaviour in relation to 
environmental indicators (Kažukauskas et al., 2011; Kažukauskas et al., 2010). In order to 
isolate the cross-compliance effect we need to control for unobservable farm productivity 
changes. In line with Levihnson and Petrin (2003) we use the farm’s choice of intermediate 
inputs  to  control  for  unobserved  farm  individual  productivity  ( ).  We  assume  that  the 
demand for intermediate inputs is given by  , where   are intermediate 
inputs (such as energy or fuel),   is capital and   is land, and that intermediate input 
demand  is  monotonic  in  .  Inverting  this  function  will  give  us  an  expression  for  
  that  can  be  used  to  control  for  productivity  in  our  difference-in-
differences models in a non-parametric way. 
 
As our outcome variables (pesticide and fertiliser use) are also farm production inputs that 
may affect farm productivity we use a lagged productivity term ( ) in our empirical 
models to avoid endogeneity problems which may arise.  
 
As indicated, differences in the timing and nature of the reform policies implemented across 
the  EU15  countries  are  used  as  a  natural  experiment  for  establishing  causal  policy 
relationships. As discussed in detail in Section 2, the Member States are grouped in terms of 
the timing of the implementation of the cross-compliance measures. Countries that are subject 
to the cross-compliance measures only from 2005 represent the control group, and countries 
                                                       
8 As learning-by-doing effect might confound our main policy treatment effects using the “backward looking” 
difference-in-differences  approach,  we  do  a  robustness  check  (see  Section  5)  using  the  common  “forward 
looking” difference-in-differences method for our limited available data. The robustness check confirms our 
main results. 9 
 
that  have  had  the  national  cross-compliance  instruments  earlier  than  2005  represent  the 
treatment group.  
 
It is important to note that even though the cross-compliance measures were exogenous for 
individual  farmers,  the  potential  country  self-selection  into  implementing  national  cross-
compliance might cause a bias in our estimates if the particular countries’ decisions were 
based  on  farm  fertiliser  or  pesticide  use.  We  argue  that  the  national  cross-compliance 
measures were very broad and that the primary policy goals were very diverse, thus, the use 
of fertiliser and pesticide expenditures as partial indicators for measuring policy effectiveness 
is not likely to be correlated with the cross-compliance policy implementation decisions. The 
decisions  on implementing the national cross-compliance regulations were more related to 
political  climate  in  the  particular  countries
9,  agricultural  authorities’  incentives, 
environmental and farm lobby groups influence powers (Jones, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, to reduce the potential country specific bias, the heterogeneity across countries 
is  controlled  by  the  country  specific  dummies  and  the  country  specific  time  trends.  This 
allows treatment and control countries to follow different trends thus further strengthening our 
identification  (Angrist  and  Pischke,  2009).  The  motivation  for  including  these  variables 
comes  from  the  fact  that  countries  have  slightly  varying  national  agricultural  policies, 
different socio-economic conditions and climates which may affect the trends in our variables 
of interest across EU Member States. A similar motivation exists for the inclusion of farm 
sector time trends given that the EU cross-compliance policies affect farms in different ways 
depending on their farm sector. This is incorporated into the difference-in-differences model 
in the following way: 
 
            (1) 
Where   are country specific intercepts;  are country specific time trends;   are farm 
sector
10  specific intercepts; and    are farm sector specific time trends;    is a binary 
treatment indicator of cross-compliance for countries which implemented the national cross-
                                                       
9 For example, in Denmark, in April 2002, cross-compliance was abandoned for political reasons by the new 
liberal-conservative government (Kristensen and Primdahl, 2006). 
10 Farm sector dummies are based on FADN Type of Farms (TF) clustering methodology. 10 
 
compliance policy pre-2005;   is a time dummy for the year of the national cross-compliance 
policy implementation; and   are time dummies by year;   are farm specific time invariant 
variables;   are farm specific time variant variables, including the polynomial to control for 
productivity;    is  a  constant.  We  are  interested  in  the  sign  and  significance  of  the   
coefficient which will measure the cross-compliance policy effect. 
 
Farmers in different countries might have a greater reliance on subsidies than others. This 
might suggest that farmers might be less responsive to policy changes if farm incomes are not 
significantly dependent on farm direct payments. Our farm direct payment dependency rate 
variable ( ) is denominated by total farm output, so it takes into account the extent to 




The inclusion of this variable in our triple difference-in-differences analysis therefore controls 
for the fact that the environmental friendly behaviour of farms may depend on the extent to 
which they rely on farm direct payments:  
 
 
                    (3) 
In this model we check for whether the direct payment dependency rate has an effect on farm 
environmental  performance  given  the  national-wide  cross-compliance  policy  introduction. 
This effect will be determined by the   coefficient. 
 
The farm’s  environmental  performance may also be affected by its  participation  in  agro-
environmental schemes.
11 To control for this we also consider the following model: 
 
                                                       
11  For  example,  Pufahl  and  Weiss  (2009)  find  that  agri-environmental  schemes  significantly  reduced  the 
purchase of fertiliser and pesticide of individual farms in Germany.  11 
 
 
            (4) 
 is a dummy variable for whether the farm participates in agro-environmental schemes. 
All other variables and coefficients have the same meaning as in the previous equations. In 
this model, the effect of cross-compliance on farm environmental performance, given farm 
participation in agro-environmental schemes, will be determined by the   coefficient. 
 
As a robustness check for possible endogeneity problems we use the lagged   and   
in  the  respective  models  presented  above.  The  results  are  in  line  with  the  results  of  the 
original models presented below.
12  
 
4.   Data sources and description   
For the purpose of this analysis we use the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) farm 
level data for the EU15 countries for the 2001-2007 time period. The FADN dataset is created 
by the European Union as an instrument for evaluating the income of agricultural holdings 
and the impacts of the CAP. Derived from annual national surveys, the FADN data is based 
on the same bookkeeping principles across all EU countries. Farm holdings for the national 
surveys are selected to get farm population representative samples at country/region level.  
 
Our dependent variables are fertiliser and crop protection expenditures which are deflated 
using country specific and the farm production input specific deflators from Eurostat. Table 
A1 in the appendix presents the descriptive statistics for these two variables across all EU 
Member States for the pre-2005 and post-2005 time periods. The set of control variables and 
the dependent variables are summarised for the full sample and the balanced sample in Table 
2.  Farm  dependency  on  farm  direct  payments  (subsidies  and  decoupled  payments)  is 
measured by our constructed farm subsidy dependency ratio variable (dpr). Participation in 
the agro-environmental schemes is measured by a dummy variable (ENV), and all monetary 
variables (farm capital, intermediate inputs, farm direct payments) are measured in Euros. 
 
                                                       
12 The full set of results is available from the authors upon request.  12 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of variables for the EU15 MS separated by the treatment/control 
groups and by full/balanced samples, 2001-2007 
The control group 
   Full sample  Balanced sample 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev 
Pesticide, EUR  295,318  4,065  12,655  92,534  4,417  10,649 
Fertiliser, EUR  295,318  4,186  9,011  92,534  4,782  7,895 
dpr  295,301  0.278  0.291  92,534  0.319  0.297 
Capital, EUR  295,318  127,083  246,943  92,534  122,736  187,523 
Intermediate inputs, EUR  295,318  59,984  155,543  92,534  60,590  121,558 
Land, ha  295,318  55  116  92,534  64  102 
ENV  295,318  0.215  0.411  92,534  0.272  0.445 
Farm direct payments, EUR  295,318  18,962  39,460  92,534  21,716  28,118 
 
The treatment group 
   Full sample  Balanced sample 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev 
Pesticide, EUR  90,356  9,578  28,296  34,411  8,469  24,774 
Fertiliser, EUR  90,356  8,744  23,368  34,411  7,979  19,722 
dpr  90,350  0.239  0.240  34,411  0.247  0.229 
Capital, EUR  90,356  336,230  654,813  34,411  231,233  399,693 
Intermediate, EUR  90,356  150,468  344,983  34,411  122,197  258,963 
Land, ha  90,356  117  288  34,411  111  255 
ENV  90,356  0.501  0.500  34,411  0.587  0.492 
Farm direct payments, EUR  90,356  43,798  112,014  34,411  40,925  97,544 
Notes: Farm holdings from Belgium are not included in the balanced sample due to the changes in Belgian 
sample selection strategy and the new identification numbers for Belgian farms. All monetary variables are 
deflated by their country specific deflators from Eurostat. 
 
 
Table  2 presents the descriptive statistics on the main variables included in the empirical 
analysis, separated by the treatment and the control groups. Of particular note is the fact that 
farms in the treatment and the control groups are different in terms of size. On average, the 
farms in the treatment group are at least twice as big as the farms in the control group in terms 
of  their  capital  and  farming  land.  Thus,  it  is  important  to  control  for  farm  heterogeneity 
differences in our empirical analysis. 
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Figure A1  in the appendix  depicts  fertiliser and pesticide expenditure per hectare for the 
EU15 MS during 1999-2007, separated by the treatment and the control groups. We observe 
somewhat similar trends in the fertiliser and pesticide expenditure for both groups. Also, there 
is some evidence that, during 2000-2004, the treatment group decreased their fertiliser and 
crop  protection  expenditure  relative  to  the  control  group.  However,  there  are  substantial 
differences between the both groups. Controlling for these factors is essential before we can 
make any conclusions regarding the effects of cross-compliance. 
 
5.   Cross-compliance effects  
From the data description presented in the previous section, it is not clear whether on average 
farmers in the treated group reduced their fertiliser and pesticide use in the last years due to 
cross-compliance. However, the dynamics of fertiliser and pesticide use might depend on 
many other factors which should be taken into account when measuring policy effects. The 
results  of  our  difference-in-differences  model  given  in  Equation  (2),  which  attempts  to 
identify these effects, are presented in Table 3. Columns (1) to (4) summarise the estimates of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and panel fixed effects (FE) models for the unbalanced EU15 
sample.  It  is  evident  that  farmers  subject  to  national  cross-compliance  before  2005  (our 
treatment group) reduced their fertiliser use by between EUR 420 (FE) and EUR 454 (OLS), 
and pesticide use by between EUR 496 (FE) and EUR 611 (OLS) relative to our control group 
in the same time period. This is between 4.8 and 5.2 percent of the average annual fertiliser 
expenditure and between 5.2 and 6.4 percent of the average annual pesticide expenditure of 
the treated farms. The results are very similar when the balanced sample is used (see columns 
(5) to (8)). 
 
It must be noted that our control period (post-2005) coincides with the introduction of the 
farm  subsidy  decoupling  policy.  This  policy  itself  might  have  changed  farm  production 
behaviour (e.g. see Sckokai and Moro (2009), Kažukauskas et al. (2010) and Kažukauskas et 
al. (2011)). We try to control for this by controlling for farm productivity changes with the 
inclusion of a polynomial function of the set of farm inputs. Another issue with using 2005-
2007 as the control period is that farmers may anticipate the introduction of cross-compliance 
thus biasing the estimated effect of cross-compliance by altering the behaviour of the control 
group in the treatment period. We perform a robustness check for whether the introduction of 
the  decoupling  policy  in  2005  and  our  “backward  looking”  quasi-experimental  approach 14 
 
presented  in  Table  3  are  validated  by  a  common  “forward  looking”  quasi-experimental 
difference-in-differences  identification  strategy  for  the  introduction  of  national  cross-
compliance policy measures by comparing our treatment and control groups between 1999
13 
(pre-treatment year) and 2001 (post-treatment year). The robustness check partially confirms 
our main results in Table 3 but the policy effects are smaller and, in the case of fertiliser use, 
they are insignificant (see Table A5 in the appendix). 
 
As discussed, incentives to comply with environmental standards might be highest for the 
farmers that receive the highest subsidy payments. To see whether this is the case we estimate 
the difference-in-differences-in-differences econometric model which contains the interaction 
between the farm subsidies to total farm output ratio, the binary treatment indicator and the 
year dummy variable (see Equation (3)). We focus on the coefficient on this interaction term 
as it represents the impact of the introduction of national cross -compliance given the farm 
subsidy dependency level.  
 
Table 4 highlights that there are no significant differences between treated and control farms 
across different levels of subsidy dependence. The estimates are insignificant across all 
models for both the balanced and unbalanced samples. Furthermore, the coefficient on the 
interaction term for the treatment variable and year (Y*T) remains negative and statistically 
significant across most of the models. These results do not support the argument that farmers 
who rely on larger shares of subsidies in total output have stronger incentives to comply with 
the cross-compliance measures. This result might reflect the nature of this policy in that all 
farmers, irrespective of the level of subsidy payments they receive, are subject to the same set 
of  environmental  requirements.  Our  reasons  for  expecting  higher  levels  of  farm  subsidy 
dependency to significantly affect farm compliance is that farmers may lose relatively more of 
their income in the form of fines in the event of non-compliance. The insignificant effect 
observed  here  might  reflect  a  low  probability  of  policy  enforcement,  being  checked  and 
punished under this regulation and a relatively low non-compliance fine. 
                                                       
13 Due to data availability issue for the pre-treatment time period we use just one available year (1999). Table 3 Cross-compliance effect on fertiliser and pesticide use 
 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Outcome variable  Fertiliser  Fertiliser  Pesticide  Pesticide  Fertiliser  Fertiliser  Pesticide  Pesticide 
Model  OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS  FE 
Y*T  -454.2**  -419.9***  -611.2**  -496.4**  -561.7***  -476.4***  -541.6*  -389.2* 
 
(201.5)  (147.1)  (268.7)  (191.2)  (177.5)  (159.9)  (275.9)  (197.8) 
Y  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted  Omitted 
T  132.0  -69.3  749.0*  51.4  531.4*  212.8  7463.6***  5840.5*** 
 
(312.7)  (216.1)  (398.6)  (249.7)  (278.5)  (380.8)  (598.3)  (399.7) 
ENV   -840.3***  -1.8  -941.5***  -29.8  -1030.7***  380.9  -1157.4***  -45.6 
 
(183.8)  (74.3)  (201.6)  (51.4)  (198.9)  (104.0)  (283.2)  (77.3) 
Constant   47840.1  177497.3**  -1348838***  -196553.2  -2244717***  100366.6  -6306594***  -516804.6*** 
 
(419459)  (82340.5)  (350902.5)  (164142.8)  (416549.1)  (95062.2)  (608683.9)  (135762.4) 
Year effects  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  
Farm fixed-effects  no   yes   yes   yes   no   yes   no   yes  
Country*time trend  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  
Sector*time trend  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  
Polynomial   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  
R-squared  0.6809  0.0205  0.6637  0.0271  0.7411  0.0326  0.7286  0.0533 
No. of observations   306949  306949  306949  306949  123276  123276  123276  123276 
No. of countries   15  15  15  15  14  14  14  14 
Panel  unbalanced  unbalanced  unbalanced  unbalanced  balanced  balanced  balanced  balanced 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for clustering at the region level are reported in parentheses. T is the binary treatment indicator of cross-compliance; Y is the 
time dummy for the year of the cross-compliance policy implementation; ENV is a dummy variable for farms receiving compensations for their participation in 
other agro-environmental schemes. Belgium drops from the balanced sample.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Table 4  Cross-compliance effect on fertiliser and pesticide use when taking into account farm subsidy dependency 
 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Outcome variable  Fertiliser  Fertiliser  Pesticide  Pesticide  Fertiliser  Fertiliser  Pesticide  Pesticide 
Model  OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS  FE 
dpr*Y*T  -221.6  -26.2  -505.3  163.9  -760.4  -125.8  70.4  439.4 
 
(653.1)  (240.9)  (791.0)  (323.3)  (549.3)  (307.7)  (688.2)  (411.2) 
dpr*Y  408.1  155.8  1037.0  416.1   714.8  152.3  416.7  148.0 
 
(615.8)  (207.7)  (777.5)  (262.8)  (501.0)  (269.7)  (683.6)  (343.9) 
dpr*T   72.8  1579.7**  -157.3  1611.1**  722.5  1961.1**  -198.3  1325.8 
 
(365.8)  (607.9)  (1226.3)  (743.8)  (1365.7)  (828.1)  (1596.0)  (856.8) 
Y*T  -420.3*  -419.4**  -526.4*  -563.8**  -414.5  -455.8**  -676.2**  -562.2** 
 
(227.3)  (169.2)  (268.5)  (226.1)  (250.7)  (203.0)  (281.4)  (280.8) 
dpr  -1899.1  -2100.0***  -2740.7**  -2485.5***  -2915.2*  -2479.6***  -3086.2*  -2250.8** 
 
(1164.3)  (614.9)  (1349.6)  (748.2)  (1570.8)  (836.3)  (1818.4)  (865.6) 
Y  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted 
T  71.7  -360.9  688.7*  -223.8  386.1  -229.1  7629.4***  5606.7*** 
 
(365.8)  (227.1)  (398.8)  (191.3)  (442.7)  (393.0)  (698.2)  (288.2) 
ENV  -653.8***  45.7  -668.3***  28.8  -805.8***  99.9  -864.3***  10.4 
 
(172.2)  (76.7)  (197.1)  (53.8)  (167.8)  (108.0)  (268.0)  (80.6) 
Constant   90889.0  181526.0**  -1334216***  -244192.5  -2331990***  119820.7  -6395192***  -534372.2*** 
 
(442674.6)  (86218.7)  (370762.3)  (159359.4)  (440922.8)  (95164.8)  (663957.9)  (139029.8) 
Year effects  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  
Farm fixed-effects  no   yes   no   yes   no   yes   no   yes  
Country*trend  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  
Polynomial   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  
Sector*trend  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  
R-squared  0.6816  0.0214  0.6646  0.0281  0.7422  0.0341  0.7299  0.055 
No. of observations   306934  306934  306934  306934  123276  123276  123276  123276 
No. of countries   15  15  15  15  14  14  14  14 
Panel  unbalanced  unbalanced  unbalanced  unbalanced  balanced  balanced  balanced  balanced 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for clustering at the region level are reported in parentheses. dpr is a ratio of farm direct payments by total farm output; T is the binary 
treatment indicator of cross-compliance; Y is the time dummy for the year of the cross-compliance policy implementation; ENV is a dummy variable for farms receiving 
compensations  for  their  participation  in  other  agro-environmental  schemes.  Belgium  drops  from  the  balanced  sample.  ***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1.Some farmers participate in other voluntary agro-environmental schemes. We might expect 
that for these  farmers it is  easier to  conform  to cross-compliance requirements  due to 
learning-by-doing  effects  and  also  due  to  a  higher  probability  of  being  selected  for 
inspection. To see whether this is the case we measure the difference-in-differences-in-
differences econometric model which contains the interaction between the environmental 
subsidy dummy (our proxy for participation in other agro-environmental programmes), the 
treatment variable and the year dummy (see Equation (4)). The coefficient on this term 
represents the impact of compulsory cross-compliance for farms that are subject to other 
agro-environmental requirements. 
 
Table  5  reveals  a  negative  coefficient  on  the  triple  interaction  term  almost  across  all 
models. This finding indicates that farmers in the treated group that participate in other 
environmental programmes reduce their polluting chemical use by more than those farmers 
who are not in an environmental programme. The negative coefficient on this interaction 
term is statistically significant in the four models for fertiliser use only. This finding might 
suggest that farmers, who participate in additional agro-environmental schemes, have more 
incentives  and  knowledge  on  how  to  comply  with  certain  environmental  standards. 
Likewise,  if  we  assume  that  farmers,  who  are  subject  to  other  agro-environmental 
measures, face more sensitive environmental issues (such as being in Natura 2000 areas, 
for example), this result might hint at the possibility that the cross-compliance regulation 
helps to convince farmers to comply with the additional agro-environmental regulations. 
Thus we might conclude that cross-compliance reinforces other policies aimed at reducing 
the impact of farming activities on the environment at least in cases related to fertiliser. 
 
The  above  models  are  estimated  for  the  EU15  Member  States.  To  see  whether  cross-
compliance has similar effects when we consider the EU27 MS, we estimate the same 
models for the extended full sample for the period 2001-2007 that include the MS that 
joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. The results of all three models are summarised in the 
tables A2-A4 in the appendix. They show that the estimates across all models are similar to 




(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Outcome variable   Fertiliser  Fertiliser  Pesticide  Pesticide  Fertiliser  Fertiliser  Pesticide  Pesticide 
Model  OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS  FE 
ENV*Y*T  -1074.1*  -369.0**  -530.5  11.1  -823.0**  -492.7**  -61.1  -168.6 
 
(584.0)  (162.8)   (666.0)  (223.8)  (342.2)  (204.5)  (583.5)  (219.5) 
ENV*Y  907.9  161.5  337.6  -57.6  315.3  277.5  -368.1  124.1 
 
(575.2)  (154.5)  (646.7)  (207.7)  (311.6)  (194.2)  (530.0)  (200.2) 
ENV*T  734.4  54.9  126.8  -161.3  364.0  -56.4  -480.0  -164.4 
 
(723.6)  (201.3)  (731.2)  (198.1)  (567.2)  (283.2)  (561.2)  (257.0) 
Y*T  77.6   -276.2  -373.1  -511.0*  -223.9  -231.6  -614.8  -288.4 
 
(344.4)  (180.2)  (416.2)  (261.2)  (326.5)  (220.0)  (558.5)  (280.5) 
ENV  -1424.3**  -11.5  -1020.6  93.5  -1164.6**  71.6  -671.7  30.4 
 
(680.9)  (189.6)  (665.0)  (188.9)  (510.3)  (261.9)  (407.2)  (241.7) 
Y  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted 
T  -474.5  -210.0  501.7  78.5  537.0  342.1  8057.3***  5960.7*** 
 
(466.1)  (262.6)  (515.2)  (326.3)  (474.3)  (545.3)  (595.9)  (543.2) 
Constant   -77819.6  145227.1  -1379706***  -189472.8  -2284791***  37356.8  -6295443***  -547619*** 
 
(470040.2)  100544.2  (407836.3)  (171350.3)  (427719.2)  (118344.4)  (622395.3)  (138697.4) 
Year effects  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  
Farm fixed-effects  no   yes   no   yes   no   yes   no   yes  
Country*trend  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  
Sector*trend  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  
polynomial   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  
R-squared  0.6810  0.0206  0.6637  0.0271  0.7411  0.0330  0.7287  0.1185  
No. of observations   306949  306949  306949  306949  123276  123276  123276  123276 
No. of countries   15  15  15  15  14  14  14  14 
Panel  unbalanced  unbalanced  unbalanced  unbalanced  balanced  balanced  balanced  balanced 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for clustering at the regional level are reported in parentheses. ENV is a dummy variable for farms receiving compensations for their 
participation in other agro-environmental schemes; T is the binary treatment indicator of cross-compliance; Y is the time dummy for the year of the cross-compliance policy 
implementation. Belgium drops from the balanced sample. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.6.   Conclusion  
To date, the overall effect of the CAP reform and newly introduced environmental cross-
compliance measures is not clear. The existing studies on environmental benefits arising 
from cross-compliance are few and mainly based on either expert judgement or simulation 
models rather than direct measurement of environmental outcomes. To the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to empirically evaluate the impacts of the newly 
reorganised  European  agriculture  policy  on  farmers’  environmental  performance.  Our 
identification strategy is to use a differences-in-differences approach, where we investigate 
the differential environmental response of farms subject to the cross-compliance policy 
implementation relative to the performance of farms that were not subject to the cross-
compliance measures. We consider two proxy variables to capture farm environmental 
performance: expenditure on pesticides and fertilisers. To sharpen the identification of the 
cross-compliance  policy  effect,  we  take  into  account  farms’  dependency  on  overall 
subsidies  and  also  their  participation  in  other  agro-environmental  schemes.  We  also 
account  for  observed  and  unobserved  farm-level  heterogeneity  by  controlling  for  farm 
unobserved productivity changes, farm fixed effects, etc.  
 
We find evidence that farmers subject to the national pre-2005 cross-compliance policy 
improved their environmental performance by significantly reducing their fertiliser and 
pesticide  use.  This  effect  is  approximately  5  percent  of  the  average  annual  fertiliser 
expenditure and 6 percent of the average annual pesticide expenditure of the treated farms. 
 
We find no significant differences between treated and control farms when we take into 
account farm subsidy dependency levels. This might reflect a low probability of being 
checked  and  punished  under  this  regulation  and  a  relatively  low  non-compliance  fine. 
When we take into account farms that participate in other agro-environmental programmes 
we find evidence that the cross-compliance policy effect is mostly negative and significant 
for fertiliser allowing us to conclude that the cross-compliance reinforces other policies 
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Table A1 Descriptive statistics of pesticide and fertiliser expenditure by country (EU25) 
 
Country 
Pesticide expenditure, EUR  Fertiliser expenditure, EUR 
Pre-2005  Post-2005  Pre-2005  Post-2005 
Mean  Obs.  Mean  Obs.  Mean  Obs.  Mean  Obs. 
BEL  5555  4655  7264  3375  6630  4655  7812  3375 
CYP  1684  432  1024  1146  2909  432  1600  1146 
CZE  41784  1287  42513  3781  36902  1287  42991  3781 
DAN  8337  7554  10310  5350  9860  7554  12282  5350 
DEU  11498  26132  14870  21527  11780  26132  17699  21527 
ELL  1151  16530  1258  11707  1490  16530  1726  11707 
ESP  1677  31643  1710  24456  2867  31643  2966  24456 
EST  3427  482  4464  1461  7635  482  11552  1461 
FRA  9363  29613  9554  21687  9568  29613  10393  21687 
HUN  15884  1841  13679  5549  15962  1841  15166  5549 
IRE  1358  4885  886  3585  5541  4885  5300  3585 
ITA  2651  59316  3442  42445  2717  59316  3658  42445 
LTU  5714  1027  6036  3335  11209  1027  13975  3335 
LUX  3675  1830  4585  1338  7095  1830  8011  1338 
LVA  6520  779  5972  2869  11062  779  13448  2869 
MLT  1180  240  1360  813  1511  240  1776  813 
NED  10280  4963  12321  4056  6926  4963  7723  4056 
OST  1337  7561  1444  5998  1787  7561  2099  5998 
POL  1450  11722  2504  35520  3036  11722  4699  35520 
POR  1192  7853  1211  6042  2006  7853  1938  6042 
SUO  1587  3045  1635  2559  4967  3045  5894  2559 
SVE  2721  3679  3072  2872  6834  3679  8257  2872 
SVK  44699  592  46659  1710  37020  592  41713  1710 
SVN  605  494  703  2128  1386  494  1508  2128 
UKI  9397  11088  9376  8330  12969  11088  13919  8330 
Total  5180  239243  6435  225532  5941  239243  8038  225532 22 
 




Table A2 Cross-compliance effect on fertiliser and pesticide use, EU27 
 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Outcome variable  Fertiliser  Fertiliser  Pesticide  Pesticide 
Model  OLS  FE  OLS  FE 
Y*T  -485.5**  -428.1***  -564.7**  -491.4*** 
 
(203.1)  (145.8)  (244.4)  (188.7) 
Y  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted 
T  175.2  -52.7  669.5*  31.5 
 
(312.1)  (208.6)  (359.9)  (244.2) 
ENV   -1035.7***   -60.6  -1198.0***  -45.2 
 
(234.7)  (85.5)  (263.2)  (67.5) 
Constant   -325153.6  9160.4  -1327927***  -334597.2** 
 
(473435.5)  (84300.1)  (361014.4)  (150845.2) 
Year effects  yes   yes   yes   yes  
Farm fixed-effects  no   yes   no   yes  
Country*time trend  yes   yes   yes   yes  
Sector*time trend  yes   yes   yes   yes  
Polynomial   yes   yes   yes   yes  
R-squared  0.7017  0.0287  0.6900  0.0300 
No. of observations   356082  356082  356082  356082 
No. of countries   27  27  27  27 
Panel  unbalanced  unbalanced  unbalanced  unbalanced 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for clustering at the region level are reported in parentheses. T is the 
binary treatment indicator of cross-compliance; Y is the time dummy for the year of the cross-
compliance policy implementation; ENV is a dummy variable for farms receiving compensations for 
their participation in other agro-environmental schemes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 24 
 
Table A3 Cross-compliance effect on fertiliser and pesticide use when taking into account 
farm subsidy dependency, EU27 
 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Outcome variable   Fertiliser  Fertiliser  Pesticide  Pesticide 
Model  OLS  FE  OLS  FE 
dpr*Y*T  -1056.5  9.8  -775.3  437.5 
 
(908.2)  (315.6)  (1230.7)  (0.268) 
dpr*Y  1427.7  149.1  1192.6  131.2 
 
(997.4)  (270.8)  (1329.8)  (322.5) 
dpr*T  913.4  1510.8***  -229.0  1003.9** 
 
(994.7)  (420.8)  (1307.6)  (431.0) 
Y*T  -237.2  -435.7**  -404.2  -630.1** 
 
(294.7)  (187.4)  (380.5)  (256.1) 
dpr  -3034.2***  -2028.1***  -2760.7**  -1861.6*** 
 
(1088.1)  (416.6)  (1366.5)  (419.4) 
Y  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted 
T  -155.3  -335.5  583.1  -105.2 
 
(400.5)  (217.4)  (488.5)  (232.4) 
ENV  -790.9***  0.8  -900.4***  18.8 
 
(209.7)  (85.2)  (237.5)  (68.7) 
Constant   -323667.3  11272.1  -1260221***  -355404.7** 
 
(518627.1)  (85319.6)  (418440.2)  (144637.6) 
Year effects  yes   yes   yes   yes  
Farm fixed-effects  no   yes   no   yes  
Country*time trend  yes   yes   yes   yes  
Sector*time trend  yes   yes   yes   yes  
Polynomial   yes   yes   yes   yes  
R-squared  0.7023  0.0297  0.6907  0.0308 
No. of observations   356067  356067  356067  356067 
No. of countries   27  27  27  27 
Panel  unbalanced  unbalanced  unbalanced  unbalanced 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for clustering at the region level are reported in parentheses. dpr is a 
ratio of farm direct payments by total farm output; T is the binary treatment indicator of cross-
compliance; Y is the time dummy for the year of the cross-compliance policy implementation; ENV is 
a dummy variable for farms receiving compensations for their participation in other agro-
environmental schemes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 25 
 
Table A4 Cross-compliance effect on fertiliser and pesticide use when taking into account 
farm participation in other agri-environmental schemes, EU27 
 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Outcome variable  Fertiliser  Fertiliser  Pesticide  Pesticide 
Model  OLS  FE  OLS  FE 
ENV*Y*T  -1603.9**  -482.0***  -1539.8*  -58.8 
 
(745.0)  (182.5)  (922.6)  (218.1) 
ENV*Y  13911.0**  267.6  1332.5  2.9 
 
(717.3)  (172.1)  (873.6)  (199.7) 
ENV*T  1250.5  219.6  1158.2  -63.7 
 
(773.5)  (206.0)  (925.3)  (203.3) 
Y*T  322.5  -226.6  211.9  -473.4* 
 
(433.9)  (170.0)  (564.1)  (247.2) 
ENV  -1913.0***  -176.4  -2015.0**  2.4 
 
(727.9)  (196.0)  (845.4)  (193.9) 
Y  omitted  omitted  omitted  omitted 
T  -770.6  -264.6  -236.3  20.4 
 
(550.4)  (245.3)  (699.4)  (310.8) 
Constant   -510151.3  -42491.7  -1502316***  -336136.2** 
 
(541875.3)  (96442.2)  (437363.9)  158551.8) 
Year effects  yes   yes   yes   yes  
Farm fixed-effects  no   yes   no   yes  
Country*time trend  yes   yes   yes   yes  
Sector*time trend  yes   yes   yes   yes  
Polynomial   yes   yes   yes   yes  
R-squared  0.7018  0.0288  0.6901  0.0300 
No. of observations   356082  356082  356082  356082 
No. of countries   27  27  27  27 
Panel  unbalanced  unbalanced  unbalanced  unbalanced 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for clustering at the regional level are reported in parentheses. ENV 
is a dummy variable for farms receiving compensations for their participation in other agro-
environmental schemes; T is the binary treatment indicator of cross-compliance; Y is the time dummy 
for the year of the cross-compliance policy implementation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 26 
 
Table A5 National cross-compliance effect on fertiliser and pesticide use between 1999 and 
2001 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Outcome variable  Fertiliser  Fertiliser  Pesticide  Pesticide 
Model  OLS  FE  OLS  FE 
Y*T  -192.4  -178.8  -366.0**  -301.3*** 
 
(123.4)  (128.2)  (144.5)  (104.8) 
Y  -237.8***  -267.5***  394.2***  343.5*** 
 
(60.9)  (59.8)  (143.2)  (100.8) 
T  -842.4***  175.5  -1490.2***  -706.6*** 
 
(251.2)  (258.7)  (97.6)  (130.5) 
ENV   -757.9***  -172.4**  -876.6***  2.9 
 
(158.6)  (68.9)  (227.4)  (68.9) 
Constant   201481.3  -359150.1  107983  -66563.9** 
 
(240038.7)  (250061.2)  (94101.3)  (34942.4) 
Year effects  yes   yes   yes   yes  
Farm fixed-effects  no   yes   yes   yes  
Country*time trend  yes   yes   yes   yes  
Sector*time trend  yes   yes   yes   yes  
Polynomial   yes   yes   yes   yes  
R-squared  0.6787  0.0466  0.7478  0.0962  
No. of observations   77263  77263  77263  77263 
No. of countries   15  15  15  15 
Panel  balanced  balanced  balanced  balanced 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for clustering at the region level are reported in parentheses. T is the 
binary treatment indicator of cross-compliance; Y is the time dummy for the year of the cross-
compliance policy implementation; ENV is a dummy variable for farms receiving compensations for 
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